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ATMOSPHERIC HARMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS*
I. THE ATMOSPHERICS OF PROPOSITION 8
Given the rhetoric that surrounded the Proposition 8 initiative
campaign to ban recognition of same-sex marriages in California,1 it is
easy to forget that less was at stake than may have appeared.  Because
same-sex couples may formalize their relationships as “domestic part-
ners” to whom state law provides all of the rights and privileges of
legally married spouses,2 the issues raised by Proposition 8 did not
include whether same-sex couples in California do or should have all
of the rights and privileges of married heterosexual spouses.  That
train had already left the station, as the California Supreme Court
eventually made clear.3  For the same reason, Proposition 8 did not
Copyright  2009 by Frederick Mark Gedicks.
* Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School.  I
am grateful for comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this Essay by other participants
in the Schmooze and by my BYU colleagues during a faculty colloquium.  Allison Shiozawa
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1. See, e.g., Laurie Goldstein, A Line in the Sand for Same-Sex Marriage Foes, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2008, at A (“‘This vote on whether we stop the gay-marriage juggernaut in Califor-
nia is Armageddon . . . . We lose this, we are going to lose in a lot of other ways, including
freedom of religion.’” (quoting Charles W. Coulson, founder of Prison Fellowship Minis-
tries)); Duke Heif, Clergy Vocalize Stance on Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2008, at B4 (“‘The
traditional moral values of our nation are at stake by allowing gay marriage to continue.’”
(quoting California Pastor Dan Nelson)).
2. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004).  The statute states the following:
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and bene-
fits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties
under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court
rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of
law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses.
Id.
3. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 102 (Cal. 2009). Strauss explained the following:
Proposition 8 does not eliminate the substantial substantive protections afforded
to same-sex couples by the state constitutional rights of privacy and due process as
interpreted in the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases.  Rather, same-sex
couples continue to enjoy the same substantive core benefits afforded by those
state constitutional rights as those enjoyed by opposite-sex couples . . . with the
sole, albeit significant, exception that the designation of “marriage” is, by virtue
of the new state constitutional provision, now reserved for opposite-sex couples.
Similarly, Proposition 8 does not by any means “repeal” or “strip” gay individuals
or same-sex couples of the very significant substantive protections afforded by the
state equal protection clause either with regard to the fundamental rights of pri-
vacy and due process or in any other area, again with the sole exception of access to
the designation of “marriage” to describe their relationship.
149
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implicate the question whether extending the rights and privileges of
marriage beyond heterosexual couples will undermine or otherwise
change the importance and function of marriage—those rights had
already been extended,4 so that train, too, had already departed.
What was at stake in Proposition 8 was the definition of normal-
ity, and thus the question of social acceptability.  Are same-sex rela-
tionships sufficiently “normal” that same-sex couples should be able to
formalize their intimate relationships legally, if they so choose, in the
way that intimate heterosexual  relationships have been formalized for
millennia?  Or are such relationships sufficiently outside the norm to
justify reserving the term “marriage” solely for heterosexual couples,
even if the rights and privileges held by heterosexual “spouses” and
homosexual “partners” are identical?
These are not trivial questions.  There will always be a social aster-
isk attached to same-sex couples until the day when those who wish to
can call themselves “spouses” rather than “partners”; that this differ-
ence is legally inconsequential does not obscure that it is socially and
culturally significant.5  And if (or when) that day comes, religious con-
servatives will have a more difficult time teaching distinctive principles
of moral right and wrong and otherwise holding themselves apart
from the world,6 even though—heated pro-8 rhetoric aside—they will
not be required to endorse, accept, or perform same-sex marriages in
their churches, sanctuaries, and private social groups.7
Nevertheless, I want to suggest that the harm suffered by gays and
lesbians, whom Proposition 8 implicitly label “abnormal,” just like the
harm of “normalizing” same-sex orientation and conduct, from which
the proposition has (for now) saved religious conservatives, is differ-
ent in kind than harm stemming from state denial of legal rights and
privileges.  I call this harm “atmospheric,” suggesting that the harm
stems from the social or cultural environment in which one lives, but
does not block his or her exercise of constitutional, civil, or other le-
gal rights, or otherwise deprive him or her of life, liberty, or property
as these have been traditionally understood.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
4. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. R
5. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954) (recognizing the stigma of
racially segregated public schools even when segregated schools provide a genuinely equal
education).
6. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972) (permitting Amish parents to
withdraw their children from high school attendance so as to avoid its corrosive effect on
the intergenerational preservation of their distinctive religious community).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 9–10. R
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II. WHAT IS AN “ATMOSPHERIC” HARM?
Atmospheric harms are social or cultural abstractions rather than
violations of legal rights.  An atmospheric harm is a kind of emotional
weight that one carries, consisting of the knowledge that one’s essen-
tial identity or core beliefs or practices are not approved by the major-
ity, even though they are not prohibited or penalized or even
regulated by it.  Atmospheric harms are frequently verbalized as
harms to “society” or “the community” or “the country,” in that the
relevant society or community or country is, to use a common expres-
sion, “sending the wrong message.”  By accepting or rejecting certain
persons or behavior as normal or abnormal, “the community” implic-
itly communicates its view of right or wrong, even when it tolerates
dissenters from that view.8  But this rhetoric betrays that atmospheric
harms are really individual, though frequently voiced as communal.
The weight of contrary community norms on individual dissenters
constitutes harm, even though it is unaccompanied by legal
consequences.
Atmospheric harms are distinct from aesthetic offenses.  A harm
stemming from behavior that one believes is wrong is atmospheric,
not because one finds the behavior disgusting or unattractive, but be-
cause the apparent acceptance of the behavior implied by the absence
of sanctions alters the social or cultural environment in which one
lives.  Plenty of folks believe that same-sex relationships or heterosex-
ual condemnation of them are distasteful, but normalization or con-
demnation of such relationships would constitute an atmospheric
harm to such persons only if the normalization or condemnation also
negatively affects the social or cultural environment in which they live.
The purported harm, in other words, is not that same-sex marriage
will interfere with whether or how religious conservatives themselves
enter into or act within traditional marriages, but rather that permit-
ting gays and lesbians to marry will change the social meaning of mar-
riage in ways that religious conservatives would not find congenial.
This would make traditional marriage more difficult to perpetuate or
to promote as a social and cultural practice.
For example, opposition to same-sex marriage by many religious
conservatives seems motivated by the purported threat that such mar-
riage poses to the traditional conceptualization of marriage that lies at
8. By “toleration,” I intend its classic sense of the government’s permitting the prac-
tice of minority religions that it believes are wrong, rather than its more contemporary
sense of the government’s granting equal respect and protection to all religions, majority
and minority alike.
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the theological core of many conservative religions.9  (Again, this
seemed especially the case in the Proposition 8 campaign because of
the apparent equation of domestic partner rights and privileges with
those stemming from civil marriage.)  Perhaps the least credible argu-
ment offered in support of Proposition 8 was the suggestion that in its
absence, religions that oppose same-sex marriage on theological
grounds would have been required to solemnize same-sex marriages
in their sanctuaries, temples, and other places of worship.  There is no
credible constitutional argument that would support such a result,
and even the most currently aggressive interpretations of state public
accommodation statutes do not end in a legal requirement that reli-
gions opposed to same-sex marriage perform or permit such mar-
riages in their places of worship.10
More credibly, pro-8 supporters argued that its failure would alter
the atmospherics of public education.11  Public education teaches to
the norm, and it would have been inevitable, had Proposition 8 been
defeated, that same-sex marriage would have been normalized in all
educational contexts to which sexuality and marriage are now rele-
vant.  Religious conservatives viewed this as a serious potential harm,
but it would have been an atmospheric one: Although the children of
religious conservatives may well have been expressly taught, or the
public school curriculum may have implicitly assumed, that same-sex
marriage is part of the California social norm, neither they nor their
parents would have been required to endorse, to act out, or otherwise
to approve this norm, nor would parents have been prevented from
teaching their children a morality at home or at church that departs
from it,12 or from enrolling their children in private schools that do
9. See supra note 1. R
10. See Frank D. Russo, Constitutional Law Professors Reject Arguments Made by California
Proposition 8 Proponents, CAL. PROGRESS REP., Oct. 29, 2008, http://californiaprogressre-
port.com/2008/10/constitutional_1.html (providing the original statement of fifty-nine
professors at California law schools concluding, inter alia, that there is no basis for the
claim that legalization of same-sex marriage would require churches to perform or to per-
mit the performance of same-sex marriages in buildings reserved for worship in order to
protect their tax exemptions (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451–52 (Cal.
2008)).
11. See Dan Morain & Jessica Garrison, Focused Beyond Marriage: Prop. 8 Supporters
Shrewdly Warned of Implications for Schools, Churches, and Children, Analysts Say, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2008, at A1 (noting the powerful effect of this argument on otherwise uninterested
voters).
12. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (recognizing the substantive due
process right of a parochial school instructor to teach, and of parents to provide for their
children to be taught, a foreign language).
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not teach to this norm.13  Of course, in the long run, harms that ini-
tially are purely atmospheric may become more tangible. As the un-
derlying value that an atmospheric harm reflects becomes widely and
deeply embedded in the culture, a decreased inclination to tolerate
dissenting views is likely to follow, thereby converting the atmospheric
harm into a more tangible one.
Another credible pro-8 argument concerned the fear that adop-
tion and other social welfare agencies operated by religions opposed
to same-sex marriage would not have been able to adhere to beliefs
and practices opposing same-sex marriage in placing children or oth-
erwise providing services.14  A possible compromise would exempt the
nonprofit activities of religions and their members from laws that pro-
hibit sexual orientation discrimination, while leaving for-profit activities
subject to such laws.15
13. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 531–35 (1925) (recognizing the substan-
tive due process right of parents to satisfy compulsory school attendance laws by choosing
private religious education for their children).
14. Compare Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 11, 2006, at A1 (reporting that the Catholic Charities affiliate of the Boston Diocese
would withdraw from adoption work because of state law prohibiting discrimination
against same-sex adoptive parents), with An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal
Protection Under the Constitution of the State for Same Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Legis.
Serv. P.A. 09-13 (West) (exempting religious organizations from obligation to perform,
recognize, or provide goods, services, or accommodations in connection with the solemni-
zation or celebration of a same-sex marriage where doing so would violate their religious
beliefs), and An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Free-
dom, 2009 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 82 (West) (providing that the same-sex marriage statute
“does not authorize any court or other state or local governmental body, entity, agency or
commission to compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution’s relig-
ious doctrine, policy, teaching or solemnization of marriage within that particular religious
faith’s tradition” as guaranteed by the free exercise provisions of the Maine Constitution
and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution).
The application of anti-discrimination laws to religious social service agencies might
entail more than a purely atmospheric harm, in that it would likely require religious social
service agencies affirmatively to act in a way that implies approval of same-sex marriages.
For example, such laws could compel a religious adoption agency to place a child with a
same-sex married couple despite the belief of its affiliated or sponsoring religion that such
marriages are morally wrong.
15. Cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–40 (1987) (holding that as applied to nonprofit activities of
religious organizations, statutory exemption of religious organizations from antidiscrimina-
tion laws does not violate the Equal Protection or Establishment Clause); id. at 342–44
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing that religiously restrictive employ-
ment practices are part of a religious organization’s free exercise right of self-definition
and that use of the nonprofit character of an activity as a bright-line rule to determine
whether it is deserving of free exercise protection avoids entangling the Court in theologi-
cal questions); see also Ira Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Question & Answer: A Clash of Rights?
Gay Marriage and the Free Exercise of Religion, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, May 21,
2009, http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=216 (observing that “when individuals enter
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III. ATMOSPHERIC HARMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. In General
There are hints at the legitimacy of atmospheric harms in consti-
tutional doctrine.  One of the most famous (and controversial)
passages of Brown v. Board of Education is its conclusion that separating
racial minorities from other children in the public schools solely on
the basis of their race “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone.”16  This conclusion is controversial
because the Court supported it with citations to now-discredited social
science research.17  This suggested that the harm of segregation to
African-American schoolchildren stemmed not only from their con-
finement to state facilities and services that were not truly equal to
those afforded whites, “separate but equal” notwithstanding, but also
from the condescending or hostile racial atmosphere created and per-
petuated by state segregation, which would have persisted even if seg-
regated public schools had provided genuinely equal educational
facilities.18
Wisconsin v. Yoder19 also sounds in atmospheric harm. Yoder up-
held the free exercise rights of Amish parents to withdraw their chil-
dren from public high school in violation of state compulsory
attendance laws, in part because attendance would have made it sig-
nificantly more difficult for these parents to teach Amish religious val-
ues to their children.20  The Court accepted the parents’ argument
the commercial market as employers or sellers, their federal constitutional right of free-
dom of religion is significantly limited”).
16. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (hold-
ing that maintenance of a diverse learning environment is a compelling state interest justi-
fying racial preferences in higher education admissions).
17. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 & n.11.  For a brief summary of the controversy sur-
rounding Brown’s reliance on psychological research, see Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of
Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 292–96 (2005).
18. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976) (arguing that “[d]ecisions based on as-
sumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference” do not simply deny valuable
opportunities to racial minorities, but also “inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their
victims as inferior”).
19. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
20. Id. at 211 (“Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to
Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile to
Amish beliefs . . . but also because it takes them away from their community, physically and
emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life.”); accord id. at 218;
see also id. at 212 (quoting expert testimony that forcing Amish children to attend a public
high school would “ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church
community as it exists in the United States today”).
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that transmission of their way of life to the next generation depended
upon the ability to insulate their children from the worldly influences
of a public high school.21
The notion of atmospheric harm has also been invoked in cases
involving regulation of sexually explicit speech.  The Court has held,
for example, that in addition to protecting minors and nonconsenting
adults, such regulation advances legitimate state interests in protect-
ing “the quality of life and the total community environment,” as well
as the “tone of commerce in the great city centers . . . .”22  Similarly,
the Court has relied on the atmospheric harm of sexually explicit
speech in upholding a city’s confinement of adult movie theaters to a
single zone as a legitimate means of protecting “the quality of life in
the community at large.”23
These isolated examples aside, however, atmospheric harms gen-
erally have not fared well in constitutional litigation.  With few excep-
tions, the interests protected by constitutional law must at least be
tangible, if not actually physical.24  For example, a discrimination case
from the early 1970s established that an illicit government purpose to
discriminate on the basis of race, unaccompanied by a discriminatory
racial effect, does not constitute an actionable constitutional harm
under the Equal Protection Clause.25  More recently, the Court has
21. Id. at 235.
22. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).  The Court further ex-
plained its position:
[The dissemination of pornography] concerns the tone of the society, the mode,
or to use terms that have perhaps greater currency, the style and quality of life,
now and in the future.  A man may be entitled to read an obscene book in his
room, or expose himself indecently there . . . . We should protect his privacy.  But
if he demands a right to obtain the books and pictures he wants in the market,
and to foregather in public places—discreet, if you will, but accessible to all—with
others who share his tastes, then to grant him his right is to affect the world about the rest
of us, and to impinge on other privacies.  Even supposing that each of us can, if he
wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot),
what is commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want
it or not.
Id. at 59 (quoting Alexander Bickel, On Pornography: Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, 22
PUB. INT. 25, 25–26 (Winter 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
23. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986).
24. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that the “irre-
ducible constitutional minimum” for Article III standing includes plaintiff’s pleading and
proof of defendant’s “invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particu-
larized, and actual or imminent,” rather than merely “conjectural or hypothetical”) (cita-
tions, internal quotation marks, and parenthetical numbering omitted).
25. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218–19, 226–27 (1971) (holding that a Mis-
sissippi city that closed its previously whites-only swimming pools allegedly to avoid integra-
tion did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); id. at 224 (“[N]o case in this Court has
held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of
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held that expression of a community’s moral disapproval of same-sex
intimacy is insufficient to justify criminalization of such intimacy be-
tween consenting adults in the privacy of their home.26  Likewise, hate
speech outside of the workplace is protected by the Speech Clause
unless it is likely to provoke immediate violence or constitutes a genu-
ine threat of violence,27 and even within the workplace it is protected
so long as it does not rise (or rather sink) to the level at which it is “so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that it creates a discrimina-
tory effect like “overt, physical deprivation of access to school re-
sources.”28  Neither the atmospheric harm to racial minorities
stemming from the expression of government animus toward them,
nor that to moral conservatives created by decriminalization of what
they consider to be immoral acts, nor the humiliation and insult suf-
fered by the objects of hate speech, suffices to support a constitutional
claim in the absence of direct harm to traditional conceptions of indi-
vidual life, liberty, or property.
Even the apparently exceptional decisions that seem to recognize
atmospheric harms mean less than one might think.  The atmospheric
holding of Brown has not generally taken hold in equal protection
doctrine, as attested by the abandonment of busing and other aggres-
sive integration techniques.  Rather, post-Brown racial equal protec-
tion doctrine has evolved into a means of ensuring equal racial access,
not a racially integrated society.29 Yoder has not appreciably strength-
ened parental rights to shield their children from purportedly im-
the men who voted for it.”); see also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986) (contrasting the now-dominant “anti-
differentiation” conception of equal protection with the “anti-subordination” conception,
which “seeks to eliminate the power disparities between men and women, and between
whites and non-whites, through the development of laws and policies that directly redress
th[em]”).
26. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72, 578–79 (2003); compare id. at 599
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Texas [anti-sodomy] statute undeniably seeks to further the
belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are ‘immoral and unaccept-
able’ . . . .” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986))).
27. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (declaring that the First Amend-
ment does not prohibit the criminalization of “fighting words” and “true threat[s]”).
28. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999); see also id.
at 651 (finding that to prevail on an implied private action under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, “a plaintiff must establish sexual harassment of students that is so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the
victims’ education experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access
to an institution’s resources and opportunities”).
29. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2768 (2007) (invalidating nonremedial use of race-conscious measures to achieve integra-
tion by school districts that had never been de jure segregated or that had achieved racially
unitary status after a history of de jure segregation); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273–75
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moral or anti-religious atmospheres in the public schools,30 and
regulation of sexually explicit speech continues to be primarily based
on traditional notions of protecting children and nonconsenting
adults, rather than on the tone of society that such speech might be
said to undermine.31
B. The Establishment Clause
In contrast to the rest of constitutional rights law, the Establish-
ment Clause is sympathetic to atmospheric claims.  Valid Establish-
ment Clause claims are not confined to state action that prevents
people from acting in a particular way, or that threatens religiously
discriminatory government action or private ownership or control of
persons or property.  To the contrary, successful Establishment Clause
claims frequently turn on whether state interactions with religion
make religious minorities feel excluded, on whether such interactions
imply that such minorities do not truly belong to some relevant “com-
munity” or “society,” even if there is no exclusion in physical fact.
For example, the Lemon test of Establishment Clause validity,32
terminally ill but still hanging on, has long held that state action lack-
ing a plausible secular purpose violates the Establishment Clause,
even when such legislation does not appear to constrain or coerce
individual actions.33  By contrast, the Court’s abortive attempt to nar-
row the reach of the Clause by introduction of a decidedly non-atmos-
(2003) (invalidating nonremedial use of mechanical racial preference to achieve racial
diversity in a public university).
30. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 538–39 (10th Cir.
1995) (rejecting parental claim that compulsory student attendance at a high school AIDS
awareness assembly involving sexually explicit language and demonstrations violated pa-
rental rights), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ.,
827 F.2d 1058, 1063–64, 1066 (6th Cir. 1987) (same with respect to school district’s refusal
to excuse students from reading texts that contradicted religious beliefs of students and
their parents), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
31. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244–58 (2002) (holding that
virtual child pornography is protected by the Free Speech Clause because its production
and dissemination does not involve, and thus does not directly harm, actual children).
32. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that for a statute to
conform to the Establishment Clause, it must have “a secular legislative purpose” and a
“principal or primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and must avoid
fostering “an excessive government entanglement with religion”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
33. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585–86, 596–97 (1987) (invalidating for lack
of a secular purpose a statutory mandate that creationism be taught in public schools
whenever evolution is taught); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55–61 (1985) (same regard-
ing mandatory moment of silence in public schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–41
(1980) (same regarding passive display of Ten Commandments in public school hallway);
see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (pre-dating Lemon, but reaching
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pheric “coercion” element into anti-establishment claims was a short-
lived failure.34
The currently dominant “endorsement test” positively constitu-
tionalizes atmospheric harm under the Establishment Clause.35
Among other things, the endorsement test prohibits state action taken
with the specific intent to aid religion,36 as well as action lacking such
an intent that nevertheless reasonably appears to aid religion;37 both
constitute constitutional violations even though these actions fre-
quently do not aid religion beyond creating a community atmosphere
that favors some religions over others, or belief over unbelief.  Actual
or apparent endorsements of religion are often unaccompanied by
any government action that violates individual rights or otherwise con-
strains constitutionally protected personal interests; rather, it is the
mere knowledge or belief that the government prefers certain kinds
of believers over others, or believers over unbelievers, that constitutes
the constitutional violation, even if the government never acts on that
preference.38  So the climate of evangelical favoritism created by a
program of high school football invocations,39 or the possibility that a
graduation prayer might have nudged unbelieving or nonpracticing
students to stand up while it was delivered,40 or the possible message
of Christian preference sent by a passive monument of the Ten Com-
same conclusion regarding a state initiative that prohibited teaching of any theory of
human origin in public schools).
34. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659–61 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Scalia, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that coercion is a necessary element of an Establishment
Clause claim).
35. The endorsement test was first proposed by Justice O’Connor in her Lynch v. Don-
nelly concurrence.  465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see id. at 690
(“The purpose prong . . . asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disap-
prove of religion.  The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual pur-
pose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval.”).  The Court essentially adopted the endorsement test, if not Justice
O’Connor’s precise formulation of it, five years later in Allegheny. See 492 U.S. at 592–94
(majority opinion).
36. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
37. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593–94.
38. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders . . . .”) (emphasis added).
39. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294–301, 317 (2000) (holding
that a school district’s policy permitting a student-led prayer before each home varsity foot-
ball game violates the Establishment Clause).
40. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586–87, 599 (1992) (holding that the Establish-
ment Clause forbids including clergy who offer prayers as part of a public school gradua-
tion ceremony).
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mandments in a county courthouse,41 all constituted serious violations
of the Establishment Clause despite being purely atmospheric harms.
Atmospheric harms can even appear on both sides of an Estab-
lishment Clause controversy.  Recent controversies over the proposed
teaching of “scientific creationism” or “intelligent design” along with
neo-Darwinism in public schools involved an atmosphere of support
for a theologically conservative cosmology hostile to unbelief and the-
ologically liberal Christianity, against a secular atmosphere dismissive
of this cosmology.42
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PERSISTING CONSTITUTIONAL UNIQUENESS OF
RELIGION?
It is hard to know what to make of the embrace of atmospheric
harm by Establishment Clause doctrine when most of the rest of con-
stitutional law discounts it as constitutionally inactionable.  One possi-
bility is that religious belief is special—especially worthy of protection,
yet especially prone to generate discrimination, persecution, and
other antisocial consequences.  This indeed seemed to be the consti-
tutional trade-off in Establishment Clause doctrine for several de-
cades: Religion received special constitutional protection under the
Free Exercise Clause, but was subject to special constitutional con-
straints under the Establishment Clause.43  But that apparent compro-
mise has been almost completely dismantled in recent years.
Religiously motivated actions are no longer entitled to special protec-
tion under the Free Exercise Clause,44 and financial and other tangi-
ble aid directed to religion by participants in social welfare programs
using secular eligibility criteria no longer violates the Establishment
Clause.45  In both these circumstances, atmospheric harm no longer
counts as a constitutional harm.
41. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851–56, 864–74, 881 (affirming a preliminary injunction
barring display of the Ten Commandments in two county courthouses).
42. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 728–29 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(finding that the introduction of “intelligent design” into the public school classroom “sets
up what will be perceived by students as a ‘God-friendly’ science, the one that explicitly
mentions an intelligent designer, and that the ‘other science,’ evolution, takes no position
on religion”).
43. See, e.g., Abner S. Green, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J.
1611 (1993); Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1984 SUP. CT.
REV. 83.
44. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79, 890
(1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not compel relief from incidental bur-
dens on religious exercise imposed by religious neutral, generally applicable laws).
45. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644–47, 662–63 (2002) (plurality opin-
ion) (upholding a voucher program that resulted in assistance to private religious schools,
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There is, however, one major remaining area of Establishment
Clause doctrine in which atmospheric harms still seem relevant—
namely, state appropriation of religious symbols and practices.46  As
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum illustrates,47 these cases are almost never
about state action that harms “concrete” individual interests or inter-
feres with the actual exercise of individual autonomy.  Rather, the en-
dorsement test makes the constitutionality of state deployment of
religious symbols or practices turn on whether the state is sending a
message of metaphysical inclusion or exclusion when it appropriates a
symbol or practice.  As Justice O’Connor stated when originally articu-
lating the test, “Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.  Disapproval sends the opposite
message.”48  To date, the Court has generally held that government
appropriation of such symbols violates the Establishment Clause if
they have a nontrivial religious content that is not neutralized or bal-
anced by secular symbols.49  So even though other areas of Religion
Clause doctrine have shifted to an understanding of religion that sim-
ply folds it into the general set of (less-protected) conscientious
human activities, the Court’s willingness to take note of atmospheric
where criteria for participation were secularly defined and vouchers were directed to pri-
vate schools by the choices of individual students or their parents); Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 801–03, 815–36 (2000) (declining to strike down in-kind aid to parochial schools
based upon the mere possibility that it might be diverted to religious uses, where aid was
received as part of a general program of assistance to elementary and secondary schools).
46. For detailed discussions of the persisting special doctrinal treatment of religion in
this area of Establishment Clause doctrine, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Neutrality in Estab-
lishment Clause Interpretation: Its Past and Future, in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS 191,
201–04 (Stephen V. Monsma ed., 2002); Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1087–1108 (2002).
47. 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129–30, 1138 (2009) (holding that a city’s installation of the Ten
Commandments in a city park despite refusal to allow a minority religion’s monument in
the park was government speech as to which the city could constitutionally discriminate on
the basis of content).
48. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
49. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681, 691–92 (2005) (holding that a Ten
Commandments monument installed on state capitol grounds among numerous secular
monuments did not violate the Establishment Clause); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989) (finding that a free-standing Christmas nativity scene in a county
courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, but a Jewish menorah displayed outside of a
city-county building next to a giant Christmas tree did not); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 681,
687 (1984) (majority opinion) (holding that a Christmas nativity scene surrounded by a
Christmas tree, candy canes, a Santa Claus house, and reindeer erected by the city did not
violate the Establishment Clause).
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harm in religious symbol and practice cases suggests that there still
remains something constitutionally distinct about religious belief and
practice.
